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IN THE SUP'REME COURT
OF THE STATE 0'F UTAH
LA MAR PEAY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PROVO
C[TY SCHOOL DISTRICT, a body
corporate and politic, and MERRILL
CHRISTOPHERSON, RAY MURDOCK, SHIRLEY PAXMAN, WILFORD E. SMITH, an d LAMAR
EMPEY, members of said Board,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
9722

APPELLANT'S ANSWER TO PETITION
FOR REHEARING
Plaintiff and Appellant respectfully answers the
Defendants' -Respondents' Petition for Rehearing in the
above entitled case as follows :
POINT I
The Supreme Court is not bound by the "executive"
and ''administrative" interpretation that has occurred
regarding Section 11, Chapter 104, Laws of Utah, 1961
in the definition of the word "electors."
POINT II
The Supre1ne Court's construction of Section 11,
Chapter 104, Laws of Utah was proper in holding that
electors must meet certain property requirements.
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POINT III
The Court should not consider in a Petition for Rehearing points that could have been brought up in the
original hearing or were expressly abandoned in the
original hearing.
POINT IV
The Court correctly decided that the notice given
by the School Board as required by the statute was
ambiguous and insufficient to appraise the voting public
of the issues of the election.
DATED this 8th day of April, 1963.
NIELSEN, CONDER & HANSEN
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
FRANKLIN D..JOHNSON
MORGAN & PAYNE
J. RULON MORGAN
Atto.rneys for PlaintVff-Appellant
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BRIEF IX SlTPPORT OF ANSWER TO
PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT I
THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE "EXECUTIVE" AND "ADMINISTRATIVE" INTERPRETATION
THAT HAS OCCURRED REGARDING SECTION 11, CHAPER 104, LAWS OF UTAH, 1961 IN THE DEFINITION OF
THE WORD "ELECTORS."

The Petitioners-Respondents agree that the Supreme
Court is not neces.sariJly bound by executive or administrative interpretation of statutes (See Petitioners'
Brief for Rehearing, p. 4), but they divine in the present
case that the Court gave no consideration to the executive and administrative interpretation. We are at a loss
to determine how this conclusion was reached, unless
the asstunption was made that because the Supreme
Court's decision was different than the school boards'
and the Attorney General's the Court disregarded their
decisions completely. The refusal to adopt a position
does not 1nean tlw t the position received no consideration. The fact that the present case was argued before
the Court and a brief submitted thereon by the school
board must at least implicitly mean that the Supreme
Court considered their interpretation.
The Supreme Court is not bound by the previous
decision of these bodies in the interpretation of the
present statute. Justice Frankfurter in "Some Reflections on the ~leanings of Statutes." 47 Col. L. Rev. 527,
536-37 (19-l-7) presents an interesting dichotomy in the
proper approach to the interpretation of statutes. He
says:
•· ... If a statute is written for ordinary folk,
it would be arbitrary not to assume that Congress
3
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intended its words to be read with the minds of
ordinary men. If they are addressed to specalists,
they must he read by judges with the minds of
specialists."
In the statute before the ·Court the word that is in
need of clarification is "electors." It seems absurd to
think that the school boards are in a better position to
interpret this word than the courts. The expertise of
a school board is of little value in interpreting a word
of such legal and historical meaning. In fact it would
seem that the school boards have a built-in bias in interpreting the word "electors." They would logically choose
an interpretation that would tend to favor their own
position in a leeway election. And it follows that an
"elector" with no property qualifications would be more
prone to vote for an increase in property taxes than an
"elector" with property. It is fair to let the school
boards raise their interpretation to the Court for its
consideration, which the Court has done·, but then the
Court n1ust decide which interpretation is to stand.
Judge L.earned Hand in F:ishgold v. St"lli'van D.rydock &
Repair Co., 154 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1946) aff'd. 328 U. S.
275 (1946) said this regarding the possible bias of administrative agencies :
"We do not forget that the cannon which the
plaintiff invokes is not confined to decisions inter
partes, like those of the Federal Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
Labor Board, or the Tax Court; it extends also
to the interpretations of officials charged with
the duty of enforcing statutes. Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 32·3 U. S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161; Great Northern
R. Go. v. United States, 315 U S. 262, 62 S.Ct.
4
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86 L.Ed. 836. Whether the weight to be given
to such rulings is less than to regulations for the
conduct of, or decisions in, contested cases, has
never been expressly decided, though it was intimated in Skidmore v. Swift, supra, 323 U.S. at
page 139, 65 S.Ct. at page 164; and see Judge
Frank's dissent in Duquesne Warehouse v. Railroad Retirement Board, 2 Cir., 148 F.2d 473, 485487. There is indeed a basis for making such a
distinction because the position of a public officer
charged with the enforcement of a law is different from one who must decide a dispute. If
there is a fair doubt, his duty is to present the
case for the side which he represents, and leave
derision to the court, or the administrative tribunal, upon which lies the responsibility of decision. If he surrenders a plausible construction, it
will, at least it may, be surrendered forever; and
yet it may be right. Since such rulings need not
have the detachment of a judicial or semi-judicial
decision, and may properly carry a bias, it would
seem that they should not be as authoritative;
and of this sort were the rulings of the Director
and the Attorney General in the case at bar, unlike
the decisions of the War Labor Board and the
direction of the Solicitor of the Labor Department."

Another factor not consi~ered by the Petitioners
is the inaction of the Utah $tate Legislature to correct
the interpretations made by the Supreme Court. The
decision now under consideration was published expeditiously by the Court in time for consideration by the
recent session of the Utah Legislature, and the Legislature did nothing to correct what the Petitioners feel is
an obvious error. The inaction of the Legislature would
tend to confirm the Court's decision as to the intent
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of the statute, especially in light of the fact that the
case has aroused the interest of no less than four othe-r
school boards who have filed amici curiae briefs.

POINT II
THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 11, CHAPTER 104, LAWS OF UTAH WAS PROPER
IN HOLDING THAT ELECTORS MUST MEET CERTAIN
PROPERY REQUIREMENTS.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where
a Petition for Rehearing presents nothing new and important it will be refused. See Ducheneau v. House, 4 U.
483, 11 P. 618 (1886),Jones v. House, 4 U. 484, 11 P. 619
(1886). And also where the Court has not misconstrued
or overlooked some material facts and not overlooked
some statute or decision nor applied an improper principle of law that caused the Court to reach an improper
decision, the Court will deny a Petition for Rehearing.
Cumm~"ngs v. Nielsen, 42 U. 157, 129 P. 619 (1913). The
Petitioners have not presented any proper new or overlooked matters, nor have they presented any decisions
or improper consideration of the Court that would entitle this case to be reheard.
In light of the above, and the fact that we could add
nothing to what has already been presented to the Court
on this point, we feel it would be redundant to offer
further cases to substantiate the present position of
the Court.
POINT III
THE COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER IN A PETITION FOR REHEARING POINTS THAT COULD HAVE
BEEN BROUGHT UP IN THE ORIGINAL HEARING OR
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WERE EXPRESSLY ABANDONED IN THE
HEARING.

ORIGINAL

Petitioner on page 4 of his original brief before
the Supreme Court stated:
"Issue number (2) above, is the questioned
statute unconstitutional because it requires no
property qualification of electors voting on the
proposition, was argued extensively before the
trial court. It is not cited by appellant here as a
ground for reversal, nor is this point argued. We,
therefore, take it to be abandoned on this appeal
and shall not belabor the question further."
The Supreme ·Court has repeatedly ruled that points
cannot be raised on rehearing that could have been
raised in the original hearing by the briefs and oral
argument. In re Lowe's Est.ate, 68 U. 49, 249 P. 128
(1926). In this particular case the Petitioners-Respondents and the Appellant expressly abandoned this constitutional issue, and it is not proper to let it be raised
at this time in the Petition for Rehearing. The Petitioner
has not raised this constitutional issue in his petition,
hut the A1nici Curiae's Petition raises it in Point I.B
of their petition and argues it extensively. The Amici
Curiae should not be entitled to a privilege that is denied
the original parties to the litigation, and therefore the
Court should not consider their newly raised issue of
constitutionality on this point. See Barnes v. Lehi City,
7± F. 321, 279 P. 878 (1929) wherein the Court held
that the Amicus Curiae was not entitled to a rehearing
when all parties to the dispute accepted the decision
as final.
7
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The Petitioners-Respondents and the Amici Curiae
argue extensively that the Court should have required
a showing that sufficient invalid votes were cast to
change the election results before invalidating the election. See Petitioners' Brief, page 8, and Amici Curiae's
Brief, page 23. This point was not presented at the
original hearing nor was it even presented in the trial
court, and therefore cannot be relied upon in the Petition for Rehearing as ground for reversal. See In Re
Lowe's Estate, supra; Harrison v. Ha,rber, 44 U. 541,
142 P. 716 (1914); Swanson V. s~"ms, 51 u. 485, 170 P.
774 (1918); Dahlquist v. Denver and R.G.R. Co. 52 U.
438, 174 P. 833 (1918).
The reason for the above rule is obvious, and its
application in the present case is essential. The parties
concerned were aware of this argument, and could have
brought up the issues they now wish to present to the
Court at the original hearing. They have had their day,
and should not be allowed to string out the litigation
ad infinitum by holding back points that could easily
have been presented in the original hearing.

POINT IV
THE COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT THE NOTICE GIVEN BY THE SCHOOL BOARD AS REQUIRED BY
THE STATUTE WAS AMBIGUOUS AND INSUFFICIENT
TO APPRAISE THE VOTING PUBLIC OF THE ISSUES OF
THE ELECTION.

This point has already been argued extensively, and
we do not wish to raise any new authorities or argument than what we have already presented. We would
like, however, to call to the attention of the Court the
8
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fact that not only was the notice given to the public
dPI'ectivP, but that the final authorization of the school
board to aet upon the affirmative vote of the people
was tied to the ambiguous term "minimum basic program." Both the Petitioners-Respondents and the Amici
Curiae give the public powers of comprehension not
possessed by the school board itself in framing the actual
issues of the election. Amici Curiae's Brief p. 33, Petitioner's Brief, p. 15.
Perhaps it is true that the public is not easily misled,
but it is at least entitled to the protection of having the
P~~ential facts placed before it so that an educated decision might be made. It is too much for them to have
to rely on the idea that right will be done-they should
be allowed to :know exactly for what they are· asked to
vote.
CONCLUSION
It is regrettable that a law that affects so many
people suffers such obvious defects, and that it requires
the necessity of such extensive clarification by the Supreme Court. It is also regrettable that the election held
b~· the Board of Education of the Provo ·City School
District did not meet the requirements of the act. But
such acts and interpretations are within the purview
of the judiciary, and the Court has properly undertaken
the task of shedding light on what is admittedly a very
clouded problem. The very fact, however, that the question under decision affects so many makes the decision,
whichever way it is decided, important. DefendantsRespondents infer the Court is placing catastrophe before the school boards and inviting a "plethora of liti9
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gation," and perhaps this is true. The Courts, however,
also o·we a duty to the public at large and to the legislature to interpret the statute before it and to rectify
any improper acts in its administration. The fact that
it is inconvenient to the school boards perhaps makes
the Court's decision less pleasurefull but it makes it
none the less necessary.
We respectfully submit that the Court has already
decided the present case, and that no compelling reason
has been presented for it to change its position, and
therefore we ask the Court to deny the Petition for
Rehearing.
Respectfully submitted,
NIELSEN, CONDER AND HANSEN
ARTI-IUR H. NIELSEN
FRANKLIN D. JOHNSON
510 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
MORGAN AND PAYNE
J. RULON MORGAN
128 East Center
Provo, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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